meditational attainment here presented is not "mixed with conceptual constructs regarding words, things and cognitions." This is confirmed by the Bhāṣya, with which we can in this respect agree without hesitation.
Here, then, the Yogaśāstra introduces a meditational state that is without vikalpa, that is, without conceptual constructs. 2 We may be tempted to use philosophical arguments to dismiss this claim as no more than the outcome of scholastic speculation about the mental states of yogis. I would, however, counsel against such hasty dismissal. Philosophy may not be sufficient to deal with this issue. There are psychological reasons to believe that mental states without conceptual constructs can and do exist. They contrast with "normal" states of awareness, in the formation of which language acquisition plays, or has played, an important role. More precisely, human beings have two cognitive styles, which in normal circumstances are simultaneously active. One of these is due to language acquisition; I call it the symbolic cognitive style. The other cognitive style, the non-symbolic one, does not result from language acquisition. The non-symbolic style can exceptionally be experienced on its own, without the symbolic style (or with a reduced presence of the symbolic style). Such experiences are commonly, and broadly, referred to as mystical, and then tend to be experienced as giving a more direct access to reality than is available in ordinary mental states. The method that allows certain people to experience the non-symbolic cognitive style with reduced (or even without) admixture of the symbolic cognitive style is mental absorption. 3 Several elements here enumerated in connection with the non-symbolic cognitive style recur in the sūtras about nirvikalpaka cognition. Like the non-symbolic cognitive style, nirvikalpaka cognition is "not mixed with conceptual constructs resulting from the knowledge of words"; and, like the former, the latter is characterized by a shining forth of only the object. It is also well known that mental absorption is an important aspect of yogic meditation. It seems fair to assume that the yogic nirvikalpaka attainment corresponds to the non-symbolic cognitive style, and is therefore a really existing mental state.
How does this nirvikalpaka attainment relate to savikalpaka mental states? It seems reasonable to think about perception in the two-tiered manner indicated above: two cognitive styles (the symbolic one and the non-symbolic one) are superimposed upon each other. The Yogaśāstra calls attention to the fact that the nirvikalpaka state can (exceptionally) be experienced in isolation, and this agrees with our understanding of the non-symbolic cognitive style. The yogic savikalpaka state, on the other hand, corresponds to the combined cognitive styles that are responsible for "ordinary" perception.
The Yogaśāstra is not alone in claiming that nirvikalpaka cognition can be experienced by yogins. Even some Nyāya thinkers accept this. Bhāsarvajña, for example, states this in so many words in his Nyāyasāra. 4 Even for certain Nyāya thinkers, therefore, nirvikalpaka cognition is no mere theoretical requirement. It plays a double role: it can be experienced independently, admittedly only by people who engage in certain mental exercises, and it also underlies "normal" cognition. We have seen that much the same can be said about the non-symbolic cognitive style. There is therefore no a priori reason to reject the very possibility of nirvikalpaka cognition. It is true that other Nyāya texts claim that nirvikalpaka cognition can only be established through inference and that they describe its contents in terms that are completely determined by Nyāya ontological considerations. 5 It is possible that this particular inferred nirvikalpaka cognition is open to criticism. It would yet seem one-sided and premature to reject it without taking into consideration that something rather like it may very well exist, and may indeed be experienced by certain people in certain mental states.
These observations have their use in the discussion initiated by Chakrabarti and Phillips, outlined above. Chakrabarti's claim that there can be no place for nirvikalpaka perception may have to be revised. Briefly put, if the position here presented about the two-tiered structure of the human mind is correct, and if the nirvikalpaka cognition of Nyāya, too, corresponds to at least some extent to the non-symbolic cognitive style, we will have to accept that there is, after all, a place for something like nirvikalpaka cognition also in Nyāya.
Let us now have a closer look at the definition of vikalpa presented in YS 1.9. This definition reads śabdajñ ānānupātī vastuśūnyo vikalpaḥ, which we translated: "Vikalpa [a conceptual construct] results from knowledge of words and is devoid of objective referent." The part "devoid of objective referent" reveals Buddhist influence. This is hardly surprising, because Buddhist elements in the Pātañjala Yogaśāstra have attracted the attention of several scholars. 6 Buddhist ontology had from an early date denied the existence of the world of our commonsense experience, and a ttributed our mistaken belief in its existence to the words of language. 7 The conceptual constructs that we create as a result of knowing words are therefore devoid of objective referents, and this is precisely what the sūtra says. Yogic perception, several Buddhist texts point out, is without vikalpa. 8 Brahmanical thinkers, and most particularly those of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, did not agree. For them, words do have referents, and indeed, they were convinced that the world we live in corresponds in many respects to the one and only language they recognized: Sanskrit. The ontology of these thinkers, as I have shown elsewhere, was to a considerable extent based on an analysis of the Sanskrit language. 9 They would not, therefore, agree with the part vastuśūnyo in the definition above.
They had less difficulty with the part śabdajñānānupātī, "results from knowledge of words." Words are often mentioned in descriptions of savikalpaka knowledge, also in the Nyāya school. It is for this reason that Chakrabarti suggests that savikalpaka perception is propositional. Phillips (2001, p. 108 ) calls it verbalizable. The expression śabdajñānānupātī seems to justify this. Certain Buddhist authors make a point of emphasizing that the cognition concerned may, but does not have to, be expressed verbally. Dharmakīrti uses in this context the word yogya, "suitable, able." 10 However, some Nyāya authors use expressions that suggest that words are actually present in savikalpaka cognition. This suggests that savikalpaka cognition is not verbalizable, but verbalized. This, if correct, gives rise to an important question. If words are present in savikalpaka cognition, what, then, is the difference between this cognition and verbal cognition, śābdabodha?
Consider the following passage from Keśava Miśra's Tarkabhāṣā (p. 33, l.10-11):
Savikalpaka cognition is connected with names, universals, et cetera, and concerns the relation of qualifier and qualificand as we find it in "this is Ḍittha," "this is a Brahmin," "this [man] is dark."
The association of savikalpaka cognition with language is confirmed by the word nāman, "name," as well as by the examples given -three short sentences. Savikalpaka cognition, according to this passage, takes the form of statements and is concerned with the relation of qualifier and qualificand. Savikalpaka cognition has both these features in common with śābdabodha, "verbal cognition." Here, too, sentences are involved, and here, too, the relation of qualifier and qualificand is central. The term śābdabodha, however, is reserved for cognition derived from verbal communication, from statements a hearer may be presented with. However, the different contexts in which these terms are used constitute no compelling reason to think that the end results are different. In savikalpaka cognition, too, a statement is produced, and there is no reason to doubt that this statement is analyzed in accordance with the rules that are valid for śābdabodha. This suggests that savikalpaka cognition and śābdabodha, "verbal cognition," are in the end one and the same thing, even though resulting from different situations: both are knowledge associated with a verbal statement. Is this correct? A statement in Viśvanātha Pañcānana's (or Kṛṣṇadāsa Sārvabhauma's?) 11 Siddhāntamuktāvalī appears to confirm this. It emphasizes the role played by "memory of the object produced by the word" in the production of verbal cognition (śābdabodha). Without it, it states, "someone who knows the word concerned might, in the presence of the object, arrive at verbal knowledge by means of perception." 12 I understand this statement to mean that, according to this text, verbal cognition and savikalpaka cognition are indeed identical, and that they are only distinguished by reason of the fact that they have been produced differently.
We must conclude that, at least according to certain Nyāya thinkers, there is no intrinsic difference between verbal cognition and savikalpaka cognition.
I do not know what effect the observations above may have on the discussion initiated by Chakrabarti and Phillips. I have no idea how they might respond to the conviction of the author of the Siddhāntamuktāvalī and perhaps others that there is in essence no difference between verbal cognition and savikalpaka cognition. With regard to nirvikalpaka cognition, it seems likely that its existence can be vouchsafed by sticking a bit less closely to the description that certain Nyāya texts give of it. Notes 1 -This translation follows the Bhāṣya, which is not necessarily correct. On the reliability of the Bhāṣya, see Bronkhorst 1984. 
